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Does minority ownership concentration influence the relationship between board
independence and tunneling?
ABSTRACT
Tunneling is a type of expropriation of resources from the minority shareholders of a
company by its largest shareholder. Previous research has found mixed results on the
relationship between board independence and tunneling, and on the relationship between
minority shareholder concentration and tunneling. We examine whether more independent
boards may be better at limiting tunneling when there is greater minority shareholder
concentration. Using a sample of 3,084 firm-years of Chinese companies, we find a
significant interaction between board independence and minority shareholder concentration
in a model of tunneling. These results suggest that more independent boards are more likely
to inhibit tunneling when minority shareholdings have greater voting influence over board
elections through concentration of shareholding.
Keywords: tunneling, board independence, minority shareholders, ownership concentration.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Traditional agency theory envisions a conflict between shareholders (the principal) and
managers (the agent) in which management may engage in self-serving behavior to the
detriment of the shareholders (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976). This traditional view is
premised on a dispersed ownership structure. A somewhat different picture emerges when
ownership is more concentrated, especially when there is a large shareholder who owns a
material portion of the company’s shares. This concentrated ownership structure is common
around the world, with La Porta et al. (1999) finding that over 63% of companies have a
dominant shareholder. With a more concentrated ownership structure, management may serve
the interests of the largest shareholder, even if the interests of the largest shareholder conflict
with those of minority shareholders (e.g., Lei et al. 2013; Shan 2013; Du et al. 2013). The
potential for large shareholders to harm the interests of minority shareholders is sometimes
called “expropriation” of minority shareholders (e.g., Berkman et al. 2009).
One type of expropriation of minority shareholders is when the largest shareholder
extracts resources from the company on terms that are favorable for the largest investor, but
potentially harmful for the minority shareholders. Management would be unlikely to prevent
this expropriation because the largest shareholder (through their voting control of the board)
can control management. The extraction of resources from companies by the largest
shareholder is called “tunneling” (e.g., Cheung et al. 2006).
Research has examined various means of limiting expropriation of minority shareholders.
For example, research has examined the potential for tunneling to be reduced by board
independence (e.g., Gao and Kling 2008; Qian and Zhou 2012; Shan 2013), and the
3
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concentration of shareholdings among non-controlling shareholders (e.g., Gao and Kling
2008; Huyghebaert and Wang 2012), and these studies have produced mixed results. In our
study, we combine the insights from the board independence/tunneling and minority
shareholder concentration/tunneling literature to examine the potential interactive effects of
board independence and minority shareholder concentration on tunneling.
Greater board independence and a more concentrated ownership structure among the
minority shareholders may help to limit tunneling. We also expect that these two factors may
interact to make the potential effect of board independence on tunneling stronger when
minority shareholders have a more concentrated ownership structure. A more concentrated
minority ownership structure could enhance the voting power of the minority shareholders on
the board, and thereby make the independence directors more likely to protect the interests of
the minority shareholders. One of the ways in which independent directors can protest
minority shareholders is by preventing or limiting tunneling by the largest shareholders.
We gathered a sample of 3,084 firm-years among Chinese companies from 2008 to 2009.
We find that more concentrated ownership among minority shareholders (measured as the
percentage of shares owned by the second to tenth largest shareholders relative to the largest
shareholder’s ownership stake) is negatively related to tunneling, suggesting that minority
shareholders with more concentrated ownership can constrain the largest shareholder from
engaging in tunneling. We also find that the percentage of independent directors is positively
related to tunneling.
The interaction between minority shareholder concentration and board independence
indicates that the board independence/tunneling relationship becomes negative when minority
4
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shareholdings are more concentrated. An analysis of the coefficients on the board
independence and board independence*minority ownership concentration variables indicates
that more independent boards become effective at preventing or limiting tunneling when the
second to tenth largest shareholders own at least 43% of the number of shares held by the
largest shareholder.
We contribute the literature in two important ways. First, we extend the literature on the
relationships between minority shareholder concentration and tunneling (e.g., Berkman et al.
2009; Huyghebaert and Wang, 2012) and the relationships between board independence and
tunneling (e.g., Gao and Kling, 2008; Shan 2013) by examining the potential interactive
effects between board independence and minority shareholder concentration on tunneling.
Second, most previous research on governance and tunneling draws upon data from before
2008, at which time the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) changed its voting
regulations to enhance the potential voting power of minority shareholders (through
cumulative voting) when there is a dominant shareholder. This regulatory change could have
changed the potential relationship between minority shareholder concentration and tunneling.
2. BACKGROUND LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
2.1 Tunneling
Johnson et al. (2000) define “tunneling” as the transfer of assets and profits out of firms
for the controlling shareholder’s benefit. Tunneling is a type of agency cost in which the
largest shareholder and management collude to the detriment of the minority shareholders.
Tunneling is more likely when there is a large shareholder with a dominant ownership stake
in the company who can exert strong influence on the company. Research indicates that large
5
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controlling shareholders exist in many companies around the world (e.g., La Porta et al. 1999;
Faccio and Lang 2002; Franks and Mayer 2001; Claessens et al. 1999). These controlling
shareholders could have the power to expropriate resources from the minority shareholders
through tunneling (Pagano and Roell, 1998; Johnson et al., 2000).
La Porta et al. (2002) show that firms in civil law countries (which generally have
weaker legal protection of minority shareholders) have lower Tobin’s Q than companies in
common law countries. Tunneling is more prevalent in developing countries due to the
weaker legal protection of minority shareholder and/or weaker corporate governance in
emerging markets (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Liu and Lu 2007; Li, 2010). Atanasov et al.
(2010) and Berkman et al. (2009) found that legal/regulatory changes can help to better
protect minority shareholders in emerging markets from adverse outcomes such as tunneling.
Faccio et al. (2001) found that companies in Western Europe tend to pay more cash
dividends that those in East Asia, which reduced the resources available for expropriation,
and thereby constrains the ability of the controlling shareholders of these Western European
companies to engage in tunneling. Faccio et al. (2010) point out that controlling shareholders
may prefer more debt in the capital structure (i.e., higher leverage) because debt (in contrast
to equity which has voting rights) will not dilute their control ability. Liu and Tian (2012)
further find that the company may incur excess debt to generate resources that can then
tunneled to the largest shareholder.
Tunneling has also been found to be more common when the company has political
connections. For example, Pan and Yu (2010) find that expropriation of resources from
minority shareholders is more likely among politically connected companies, particularly
6
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those in emerging markets. In the Chinese markets, Peng, Wei and Yang (2011) and Luo and
Jackson (2012) find that the controlling shareholders are more likely to expropriate resources
from minority shareholders. Fan and Wong (2001) find that controlling shareholders from
seven East Asian markets increase their control of listed companies though pyramid
ownership structure and cross-holding, which can enhance their control of the company.
Various measures of tunneling have been used in the literature. For example, Cheung et
al. (2006) Cheung et al. (2009) and Huyghebaert and Wang (2012) consider related-party
transactions, such as having the company sell goods or assets at a reduced price to the
controlling shareholder or companies affiliated with the controlling shareholder. Wang and
Xiao (2011) and Liu and He (2004) also note that controlling shareholders could tunnel
resources from the company through self-dealing transactions. Liu and He (2004) and Xu’nan
(2011) also note the potential for tunneling through non-arms-length equity transactions, and
Liu and He (2004) note that this is especially prevalent when the largest shareholder’s
ownership is somewhat less dominant.
One of the more common measures of tunneling is based on loans made to the largest
shareholder and/or other companies controlled by the largest shareholder (e.g., Jiang 2010;
Qiu 2003; Liu and Tian 2012), or through guarantees of loans made to the largest shareholder
(e.g., Berkman et al., 2009). In China, the Other Receivables account is often used to measure
tunneling by the controlling shareholder since the account is used to record related-party
loans (Qiu, 2003).
Companies engaged in tunneling may attempt to ameliorate the adverse effects of
tunneling through strategic use of accounting and earnings management. Liu and Lu (2007)
7
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point out that the controlling shareholders might manage the earnings to mask the true firm
performance. Fan and Wong (2001) also note that accounting policies can be adjusted to
benefit the controlling shareholder, and Cullinan et al. (2012) found that companies with
controlling shareholders may use less conservative accounting to mask potential
expropriation of resources from minority shareholders.
2.2 Minority shareholder concentration and tunneling
The presence of large shareholders (other than the largest shareholder) may inhibit the
ability of the largest shareholder to expropriate resources from minority shareholders (e.g.,
Huyghebaert and Wang 2012). More concentrated ownership among the non-largest
shareholders may give them greater incentive and ability to influence the company’s actions,
and thereby protect the interests of themselves and those of other minority shareholders (e.g.,
Cullinan, et al. 2013). One of the ways in which they could protect their interests is through
reduced tunneling.
Empirical evidence on this issue is mixed. Gao and Kling (2008) found no relationship
between whether the second through fifth largest shareholders own more than the largest
shareholder and the likelihood of tunneling. However, Berkman et al. (2009) did find some
limited evidence that larger shareholdings among the second to tenth shareholders1 was
associated with a reduced likelihood of loan-guarantee type tunneling.2 Huyghebaert and
Wang (2012) found more consistent evidence that the relative size of shareholdings of the
second to tenth shareholders was negatively associated with tunneling, measured based on a

1

The names and shareholdings of the ten largest shareholders are disclosed in China.

2

Note that Berkman’s sample period was from 1999 and 2000. In June 2000, the CSRC issued regulations

prohibiting any new loan guarantees for the benefit of the parent company (Huyghebaert and Wang 2012).
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related party buying from or selling to the company.
Theory would suggest that minority shareholder concentration may enhance minority
shareholder influence on the company and thereby help to reduce to tunneling, and there is
some empirical support for this position. We therefore propose that minority shareholder
concentration may be negatively associated with tunneling, and hypothesize as follows:
H1: Minority shareholder concentration is negatively related to tunneling.
2.3 Board independence and tunneling
Independent directors are not employees or officers of the organization; they are typically
officers from other companies. Because they do not work for the management of the company,
independent directors are not beholden to management and can therefore provide more
effective oversight of management and, in so doing, promote the interest of shareholders (e.g.,
Fama and Jensen 1983; Bhagat, et al. 1987). These independent directors may also have a
stronger focus on maintaining their business reputation, which can create incentives for them
to show greater diligence in their role as directors (Fama and Jensen 1983).
Board independence has been found to be associated with board decision making
(Weisbach, 1988; Peasnell, Pope and Young, 2005). For example, Weisbach (1988) found that
more independent boards are more likely to replace a poorly performing CEO and Peasnell et
al. (2005) note that board independence is associated with higher quality financial reporting.
Booth et al. (2002) note that decisions making may be enhanced by more independent boards
because the independent directors bring complementary knowledge from outside the
company.
One of the duties of the independent directors is to protect minority shareholders.
9
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Consistent with the notion that independent directors can enhance minority shareholder
protection, Anderson and Reeb (2004) found that controlling shareholders (who may wish to
protect the interests of minority shareholders) seek to limit the presence of independent
directors, especially in family-controlled firms. One of the ways in which independent
directors may protect minority shareholders is through prevenient or limiting tunneling (e.g.,
Shan, 2013).
Previous research has found mixed results regarding the relationship between board
independence and tunneling. Huyghebaert and Wang (2012) found no relationship between
board independence and tunneling, except among state-controlled firms, where board
independence is positively related to tunneling. Other research, however, has found that
tunneling is negatively related to the percentage of independent directors (e.g., Gao and Kling
2008; Qian and Zhou 2012) and to the number of independent directors (Shan 2013).
We also seek to examine the relationship between board independence and tunneling. As
previous research has found the board independence is either positively related to tunneling,
negatively related to tunneling, or not related to tunneling, we propose a non-directional (null)
hypotheses as follows:
H2: There is no relationship between board independence and tunneling.
2.4 Interaction between independent directors and minority shareholder concentration
As mentioned previously, research has found mixed results on the relationship between
board independence and tunneling. These mixed results suggest that the board
independence/tunneling relationship may be contingent on some other factors related to
tunneling, perhaps including minority shareholder concentration.
Independent directors are elected by the shareholders and are supposed to help ensure
10
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that management acts in the shareholders’ interests (e.g., Bhagat et al. 1987). All shareholders,
however, may not have the same interests, especially when there is a large shareholder who
may be able to expropriate resources from the minority shareholders. If there is a conflict
between the interests of the largest shareholder and the other shareholders, the independent
directors may have to decide whose interests to support.
If there is a large shareholder, management may take actions such as tunneling that are
beneficial for the largest shareholder (who has a strong influence on the compensation and
future employment of the executive), but which harm the interests of the minority
shareholders. Independent directors who are subject to the voting power of the largest
shareholder may not object to such tunneling, as their position on the board could be
vulnerable if they do not support the interests of the largest shareholder.
However, if the minority shareholders have a more concentrated ownership position, this
ownership concentration may enhance the voting power of the minority shareholders and thus
enhance their influence on the independent directors (e.g., Cullinan et al. 2013). If the
independent directors are more vulnerable to the voting power of minority shareholders, these
independent directors may be more likely to restrict tunneling to protect the interest of these
minority shareholders. We therefore expect that independent directors may be more effective
at inhibiting tunneling when minority shareholders have more influence on the independent
directors through concentrated ownership.
We propose a potential interactive relationship between independent directors and
minority shareholding concentration that could be related to tunneling as follows:
H3: Independent directors are more effective at preventing tunneling when minority
shareholding is more concentrated (relative to the largest shareholder).
11
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3 RESEARCH METHODS
3.1 Sample
We gathered data from Chinese companies listed on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock
Exchanges for 2008 and 2009. Data were obtained from the CSMAR and the Juchao
databases. We supplemented ownership data based on cross and common ownership among
the various owners to ensure that we measured the ultimate owner of the shares. Our sample
includes 3,084 firm-years for Chinese companies in 2008 and 2009.
3.2 Variable measurements
3.2.1 Dependent variable
Consistent with Jiang et al. (2010) we measure tunneling based on intercompany loans,
as disclosed in other receivables (OTRE). We scale this dependent variable by dividing the
other receivables by the company’s size (measured as total assets).
3.2.2 Hypothesized independent variables
We measure minority shareholder concentration (used to test H1) based on the holdings
of the second to tenth largest shareholders relative to the holdings of the largest shareholder
(CSTR). At higher levels of the CSTR, the minority shareholders have greater potential to
influence the actions of the company. To ensure clean measurements of shareholding levels,
we combined share ownership among different shareholders when there is cross/common
ownership of shares among the largest and/or other disclosed shareholders. This procedure
sometimes resulted in the largest disclosed shareholder not being the largest actual
shareholder because two (or more) of the other disclosed shareholders were under common
12
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control.3 In all cases, we based our measure of the largest shareholder based on the actual
largest shareholder, which may differ from the disclosed largest shareholder.
To test H2, we measure the percentage of independent directors (INDP) on the board of
directors. This was calculated as the number of independent directors on the board divided by
the total number of directors on the board. To test H3, we interacted the minority shareholder
concentration variable (CSTR) with the percentage of independent directors variable (INDP).
3.2.3 Control variables
We include the cash-flow rights of the largest shareholder (CASH) as a control variable.
Tunneling behavior can adversely affect firm value (e.g., Cheung et al. 2006; Jiang et al. 2010;
Du et al. 2013) harming the minority shareholders. However, as fellow shareholders of the
business, the largest shareholder engaging in tunneling would also be adversely affected by
the decline in firm value brought about by tunneling. The largest shareholder will therefore be
balancing the direct benefit they obtain through tunneling with the indirect cost they may
incur through decreased share value. We therefore expect that largest shareholders with
higher cash-flow rights will be less likely to engage in tunneling, which may not be
cost/beneficial to the largest shareholder if they must absorb more of the cost of the
tunneling.
Board size may also be related to tunneling. Larger boards may be more likely to limit
tunneling due to more independent directors being on a larger board, greater
representativeness of the larger board, and the association of larger board with less extreme
decisions (e.g., Cheng, 2008). Empirically, Shan (2013) found that a larger number of
3

This procedure also resulted in some cases in which there were less than 9 other shareholders included in

the minority shareholder concentration calculation due to the cross/common ownership.
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independent directors (implying a larger board) to be negatively related to tunneling, and
research has also found that minority shareholder concentration is associated with larger
boards, which contain more independent directors (e.g., Cullinan et al. 2013). Because we
already include the percentage of independent directors and minority shareholder
concentration, we include the total number of directors on the board (BOARD) as a control
variable.
We also include a variable measuring whether the largest shareholder has a more
dominant position over the company due to control of at least 30% of the company’s shares.
We base the 30% cut-off on regulations of the China Securities Regulatory Commission
(CSRC), which consider shareholders owning at least 30% of the company’s shares to be in a
dominant position through which they might harm the interests of the minority shareholders.
For this measure, we consider control rights, rather than cash-flow rights, which may differ
due to cross/common ownership.4 The variable (DOMIN) is coded 1 if the largest
shareholder’s control rights are 30% or more, and 0 otherwise.
Consistent with most other research on tunneling, we include size of the firm as a control
variable. Due to the skewed distribution of firm size, we utilized the inverse:

1/total assets.

We also include the ratio of debt to assets (LEV) as a control variable. Faccio et al (2010)
suggest that higher leverage can increase the power of the largest shareholder because debtors
(as opposed to investors) generally do not have voting rights. Because State-related firms

4

Consider, for example, a situation in which Company B owns 51% of the shares of Company C. Company B

therefore exercises effective control over Company C. If Company A owns 51% of Company B, Company A
controls Company B, which controls company C. Effectively, A has 51% control of C. However, if Company C
paid dividends, Company A’s would receive only 26% of the dividends (i.e., 51% A’s ownership in B * 51% B’s
ownership in C), making the cash flow rights 26%.
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may have different incentives than other firms, we include a dummy variable (STATE)
measuring whether the largest owner5 is state-related (coded as 1) or not (coded as 0). Finally,
we include two year dummy variables and 12 industry dummy variables. To control for
potential outliers, all of the variables are winsorized at 1% and 99.6 A summary of all of
these variables and their measurements are presented in Table 1.
<Table 1>
3.3 Testing techniques
To test H1, we estimated an OLS regression model with tunneling as the dependent
variable and minority shareholder concentration (CSTR) and the control variables as the
independent variables. To test H2, we regressed tunneling on the percentage of independence
directors (INDP) and the control variables. Finally, we tested H3 by running an OLS
regression model with tunneling as the dependent variable, and including minority
shareholder concentration (CSTR), the percentage of independent directors (INDP), the
interaction between minority shareholder concentration and the percentage of independent
directors (CSTR*INDP), and the control variables.
4. RESULTS
4.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the firms in our sample. For the mean
company, tunneling (OTRE/ASSETS) represents 4.43% of assets, with a maximum of
69.36% of assets, and a minimum of no tunneling. CSTR averages 0.5151, indicating that the
5

As with the ownership variables, the determination of the largest owner for coding the STATE variable is

based on the actual largest shareholder, which may differ from the disclosed largest shareholder due to
cross/common ownership.
6

All main results are robust to cross-sectional winsorization each year and no winsorization.
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second to tenth largest shareholders together hold an average of 51.5% of the number of
shares held by the largest shareholder. Independent directors comprise 36.33% of the
directors at the average company (INDP), which has a board consisting of 9.19 directors
(BOARD). Cash-flow rights (CASH) held by the largest shareholder are a mean of 33.83%.
The largest shareholder owns at least 30% control rights (DOMIN) at 67.7% of the
companies in our sample. The mean company size (in millions) is about RMB 33,000, but the
median is much lower (RMB 2,061) due to the skewed distribution of the size variable.7
Debt averages 53.12% of assets among the firms in our sample (LEV), and state-controlled
firms (STATE) comprise 61.25% of the companies in our sample.
<Table 2>
4.2 Regression results
Table 3 presents the results of our OLS regression models. The F statistics range from
90.376 to 102.247, and all of the model are significant overall at < 0.01. The adjusted
R-squares are in low 0.40s, which are comparable to many of the other tunneling models in
the literature.8
Model 1 tests H1, which posited that minority shareholder concentration would be
negatively associated with tunneling. The results for the CSTR9 variable are consistent with
our expectations in H1: minority shareholder concentration is negatively related to tunneling.

7

The largest firm in our sample, with assets (in millions) of RMB 11,785,053 is the Industrial and Business

Bank of China
8

For example, Gao and Kling 2008 report r-squares ranging from 0.11 to 0.60, Huyghebaert and Wang 2012

have r-squares from 0.03 to 0.19, and Shan 2013 report r-squares between 0.08 and 0.24.
9

Results when using a dummy variable to measure whether the second to tenth largest shareholders own at

least as many shares as the largest shareholder (untabulated) were materially consistent with the results
presented for the CSTR variables for all of our analyses.
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These results suggest that when the minority shareholders have more concentrated ownership
(relative to the ownership of the largest shareholder) tunneling is less likely to occur.
<Table 3>
Model 2 on Table 3 present the results of our testing of H2, which sought to examine the
relationship between board independence and tunneling. We find a positive relationship
between board independence and tunneling. Our results are contrary to the negative board
independence/tunneling relationship found by Gao and Kling (2008) and Qian and Zhou
(2012), but consistent with the results of Huyghebaert and Wang (2012) in their
state-controlled company sample. This result may reflect that fact that independent directors
may be independent of management, but neither management not the independent directors
may be independent of the largest shareholder, and thus may do the bidding of the largest
shareholder.
Model 3 presents the regression model of tunneling incorporating the CSTR, INDP and
the CSTR*INDP interaction variables. The CSTR*INDP interaction variable is negatively
associated with tunneling. These results are consistent with H3, and suggest that independent
directors may be more effective at limiting tunneling when the minority shareholders have
more concentrated ownership, because the independent directors may pay greater attention to
the interests of minority shareholders when these shareholders have greater voting power.
When comparing the coefficients on the INDP and CSTR*INDP variables, it appears that
independent directors become effective at inhibiting tunneling (i.e., the sign flips from
positive to negative) when the number of shares owned by second to tenth largest

17
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shareholders are at least 43%10 of the number of shares owned by the largest shareholder.
With regard to the control variables, we find that CASH is negatively related to tunneling.
This result is in accord with the notion that if the largest shareholder will incur more of the
costs of tunneling (through decreased share value, etc.) tunneling may be less likely. BOARD
is also negatively related to tunneling, possibly because larger boards may be more likely to
have a member who will raise concerns about tunneling (e.g., Cullinan et al. 2013). DOMIN
is negatively related to tunneling, suggesting that when the minority shareholders have more
voting power through cumulative voting, tunneling may be limited. The 1/ASSET variable is
positively associated with tunneling, suggesting that smaller firms are more likely to
experience tunneling. Consistent with Faccio et al.’s (2010) theory that higher leverage gives
the largest shareholder more power, LEV is positively associated with tunneling. We find no
evidence that STATE ownership is related to tunneling.
4.3 Robustness analysis
To control for possible endogeneity of board independence, we used a two-stage model
in which we create a model in which the percentage of independent directors (INDP) is the
dependent variable and the other independent variables in our tunneling model are also the
independent variables in the model of INDP. We then used the residuals (RESI) from this
model of INDP in place of the INDP variable and RESI*INDP in place of the CSTR*INDP
interaction variable. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 4. The findings from
Table 4 indicate that our main findings are robust when using the 2-stage regression
approach.

10

Coefficient on the INDP variable (0.069)/coefficient on the CSTR * INDP variable (-0.160).
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<Table 4>
4.4 Limitations
Our study is subject to a number of limitations. First, our measure of OTRE/ASSETS
may not capture all types of tunneling. Second, we do not have measures of the detailed
backgrounds of the independent directors, which may have revealed relationships with the
largest shareholder or with the minority shareholders that may have influenced our results.
Finally, while we attempted to control for other variables that may influence tunneling, and
our R-squared compared favorably to other studies, there may be other variables associated
with tunneling that we have not captured that could have influenced our results.
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A very limited body of research has examined the relationship between the share
ownership of minority shareholders and the likelihood that the largest shareholder may
expropriate resources from the minority shareholders through tunneling. We propose that if
the ownership interests of the minority shareholders are more concentrated, they will in a
better position to defend their interests than if the minority ownership was more dispersed.
The more concentrated ownership position can give the minority shareholder more influence
over the company’s affairs which allow the minority shareholders to limit tunneling. We thus
expected that minority shareholder concentration is negatively related to tunneling.
Research has found inconsistent results when examining the relationship between board
independence and through tunneling. We propose that, while independent directors are on the
board to protect shareholders’ interests, these interests may not be the same among all
shareholders. The interests of different types of shareholder may be more likely to diverge
19
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when there is a large shareholder who may be in a position to harm the interests of the other
(minority) shareholders. These differing interests may help to explain the inconsistent results
found in previous literature. Board independence may influence the extent of tunneling
experienced by an organization. However, given the potential conflict between the interests of
different types of shareholders, the direction of this relationship is not clear. The board
independence/tunneling relationship may be positive (if the independent directors are serving
the interests of the largest shareholder) or negative (if the independent directors are serving
the interests of the minority shareholders).
Combining these perspectives on board independence and minority ownership
concentration, we also propose that there may be an interactive effect of board independence
and minority shareholder concentration on tunneling. Independent directors of companies
with concentrated minority ownership may be more vulnerable to the influence of these
minority shareholders, and thus may be more likely to protect the minority shareholders by
limiting the extent of tunneling by the firm.
We use a sample of 3,084 firm-years of Chinese firms from 2008 and 2009 to test these
ideas. Our sample beings in 2008 because Chinese securities regulations were implemented
that year to empower minority shareholders to protect their interests through cumulative
voting when there is a large, dominant shareholder. Consistent with the greater influence of
minority shareholder when ownership is more concentrated, we found a negative relationship
between minority shareholder concentration and tunneling. We found a positive relationship
between board independence and tunneling, suggesting that independent directors may be
protecting the interest of the largest shareholder, even when these interests may harm the
20
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interests of minority shareholders. We also found that the interaction between board
independence and minority shareholder concentration was negatively related to tunneling.
This finding suggests that independent directors may be more likely to protect the minority
shareholders’ interests when the directors are more vulnerable to the concentrated voting
power of the minority shareholders.
Overall, our results suggest that the role of independent directors is more complex when
there is a large shareholder who may dominate the company (as is common in China and
other Asian countries), rather than when ownership is widely dispersed (as is more common
in the US). When there is a large shareholder, the bigger threat to the shareholders may not
come from self-serving behavior by management (as in traditional agency theory), but from a
divergence of interests between the largest shareholder (who may control management) and
the interests of minority shareholders. In such a context, the independent directors may not
effectively serve the interests of the minority shareholders, particularly if the minority
shareholders are widely dispersed.
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Table 1 Variable Definitions
Variable
Code

Descriptions

Data Source

Dependent variable
OTRE

Other receivables at the end of fiscal year.

Databases and
Juchao website

Independent variables
The ratio of non-controlling shareholding within the top 10 big
shareholders to ultimate control shareholding, calculated as:
CSTR

INDP

Manually coded

Percentage of independent directors served on the board.

Databases and
Juchao website

Control variables
CASH

The cash rights of ultimate control shareholding.

Manually coded

BOARD

Board Size

Databases and
Juchao website*

DOMIN

Dummy variable, coded 1 if the voting rights of ultimate control
Manually coded
shareholder are no less than 30%, 0 otherwise.

ASSETS

Total assets at the end of fiscal year.

Databases and
Juchao website

LEV

Debt divided by total assets.

Databases and
Juchao website

STATE
YEAR
INDUi

Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the ultimate owner is the
government, otherwise 0.
Dummy variable, coded 1 if the observation is in year 2008, and 0
if the observation is in year 2009.
Dummy variables (i=1~12). Choosing the manufacture industry
as the base group, coded 1 if the company is the industry i, and 0,
otherwise.

Manually coded
Databases and
Juchao website
Databases and
Juchao website

Notes: Databases include the CSMAR database. The website of Juchao Securities Information Net (http://www.cninfo.com.cn)
is the authorized website by China Securities Regulatory Commission.
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics

OTRE/ ASSET
CSTR
INDP
CASH
BOARD
DOMIN
ASSET (RMB 000,000)
LEV
STATE

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Median

Std. Deviation

Skewness

Kurtosis

0.0001
0.0230
0.2500
0.0376
5.0000
0.0000
3.3979
0.0707
0.0000

0.6936
2.4814
0.5556
0.7461
15.0000
1.0000
11,785,053
1.8430
1.0000

0.0443
0.5151
0.3633
0.3383
9.1978
0.6770
33,261
0.5312
0.6125

0.0149
0.3328
0.3333
0.3153
9.0000
1.0000
2,061
0.5175
1.0000

0.0939
0.5075
0.0501
0.1740
1.9168
0.4677
423,317
0.2621
0.4873

4.8259
1.6049
1.4987
0.3644
0.7818
-0.7576
21.1174
1.6855
-0.4621

26.9469
2.5632
2.8014
-0.6636
1.6453
-1.4270
482.4919
6.6405
-1.7876
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Table 3
Regression results examining the relationship between minority ownership
concentration, board independence and the interaction and tunneling
Dependent Variable: OTRE/ASSETS
Model 1
Coefficient
Sig.
0.045
-0.010**

0.000
0.020

VIF

(Constant)
CSTR
INDP
CSTR×INDP
CASH
BOARD
DOMIN
1/ASSET
LEV
STATE
YEAR
INDU

-0.036*** 0.002 2.564
-0.003*** 0.001 1.207
-0.013*** 0.001 2.059
0.039***
0.000 1.244
0.133***
0.000 1.113
0.000
0.990 1.227
CONTROLLED
CONTROLLED

Adj.R2
F
Sample Size

0.408
102.179***
3084

Model 2
Coefficient
Sig.
0.011

VIF

0.478

2.997
0.062**

0.026

-0.019*
0.053
-0.002***
0.003
-0.013***
0.000
0.038***
0.000
0.133***
0.000
0.000
0.936
CONTROLLED
CONTROLLED

1.128
1.778
1.288
1.729
1.239
1.110
1.221

Model 3
Coefficient
Sig.

VIF

0.016
0.307
-0.011**
0.017
0.069**
0.013
-0.160***
0.007
-0.037***
0.002
-0.002***
0.007
-0.013***
0.001
0.039***
0.000
0.133***
0.000
0.000
0.917
CONTROLLED
CONTROLLED

0.408
102.247***
3084

3.005
1.140
1.418
2.594
1.313
2.061
1.249
1.117
1.228

0.4103
90.376***
3084

Notes:
(1) Models are as follows:
OTRE

Model 1:

ASSET

  0   1C S T R   2 C A S H   3 B O A R D   4 D O M I N   5

1
ASSET

+  6 L E V   7 S T A T E   8Y E A R

12





 i8 IN D U i  

i 1

OTRE

Model 2:

ASSET

  0   1 IN D P   2C A S H   3 B O A R D   4 D O M IN   5

1
ASSET

  6 L E V   7 S T A T E   8Y E A R

12





 i8 IN D U i  

i 1

OTRE

Model 3:

ASSET

  0   1C S T R   2 I N D P   3 C S T R  I N D P   4 C A S H   5 B O A R D   6 D O M I N   7

1
ASSET

12

  8 L E V   9 S T A T E   1 0Y E A R 



 i 10 I N D U i  

i 1

(2) *, **, and *** denote statistically significant at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively, in a
two-tailed test.
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Table 4
Second Stage of 2-stage regression results in which potential determinants of
board independence are controlled in first-stage regression
Dependent Variable: OTRE/ASSETS
Coefficient

(Constant)
CSTR
RESI
CSTR*RESI
CASH

Sig.

0.0442***
-0.0101**
0.0136***
-0.0086***
-0.0355***
0.0387***
0.1337***
-0.0134***
-0.0026***
0.0003
CONTROLLED
CONTROLLED

1/ASSET

LEV
DOMIN
BOARD
STATE
YEAR
INDU
Adj-R2
F
Sample Size

0.0000
0.0226
0.0012
0.0045
0.0031
0.0000
0.0000
0.0008
0.0005
0.9199

0.4099
90.2471***
3084

Notes:
(1) Models are as follows:

Stage1
I N D P   0   1C S T R   2 C A S H   3

1
ASSET

  4 D O M IN   5 B O A R D   6 L E V   7 S T A T E

12

  8Y E A R 



 i8 IN D U i  

i 1

Stage2
OTRE
ASSET

  0   1C S T R   2 R E S I   3 C S T R  R E S I   4 C A S H   5

1
ASSET

  6 L E V   7 D O M IN

12

  8 B O A R D   9 S T A T E   1 0Y E A R 



 i 10 I N D U i  

i 1

(2) *, **, and *** denote statistically significant at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively, in a
two-tailed test.
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Figure 1: Summary of Hypotheses
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